The Atlantic Monthly, January/Feburary 2004
In the 2004 January/February issue of The Atlantic, James Fallows writes about the planning that was done by US government prior to the Iraq occupation.#
There was a great deal of research done--but it was "willfully ignored by the people in charge. This inside story [is of] historic failure."
Douglas Feith, Wolfowitz's Wolfowitz, comments on the criticism that is generally lodged at the administration:
"This is an important point," he said, " because of this issue of What did we believe? ... The common line is, nobody planned for security because Ahmed Chalabi told us that everything was going to be swell." Chalabi, the exiled leader of the Iraqi National Congress, has often been blamed for making rosy predictions about the ease of governing post-war Iraq. "So we predicted that everything was going to be swell, and we didn't plan for things not being swell," Here Feith paused for a few seconds, raised his hands with both palms up, and put on a "Can you believe it?" expression. "I mean--one would really have to be a simpleton. And whatever people think of me, how can anybody think that Don Rumsfeld is that dumb? He's so evidently not that dumb, that how can people write things like that?" He sounded amazed rather than angry. [pg. 53]
The primary problem it seemed, was that the people in charge put such a great focus on the inability to predict the future that they did not trust any or investigate any prediction what so ever. Caution turned into carelessness.
And this problem was not resolved any easier with the Pentagon being in complete control of the operation. Here is a comment about its style, versus the traditional approach:
According to the standard military model, warfare unfolds through four phases: "deterrence and engagement," "seize the initiative," "decisive operations." and "post-conflict." Reality is never divided quite that neatly, of course, but the War College report stressed that Phase IV "post-conflict" planning absolutely had to start as early as possible, well before Phase III--"decisive operations"--the war itself. But neither the Army nor the other services moved very far past Phases III thinking. "All the A-Team guys wanted be in on Phase III, and the B-team guys were put on Phase IV," one man involved in Phase IV told me. Frederick Barton, of the Center for Strategic and INternational Studies, who was involved in postwar efforts in Haiti, Rwanda, and elsewhere, put it differently. "If you went to the Pentagon before the war, all the concentration was on the war," he said. "If you went there during the war, all the concentration was on the war. And if you went there after the war, they'd say, 'That's Jerry Bremer's job.'" Still, the War College report confirmed what the Army leadership already suspected: that its real challenges would begin when it took control of Baghdad. [pg. 68-69]
Kenneth Pollack on the details of the Iraqi WMD Bubble.#
Some defenders of the Administration have reportedly countered that all it did was make the best possible case for war, playing a role similar to that of a defense attorney who is charged with presenting the best possible case for a client (even if the client is guilty). That is a false analogy. A defense attorney is responsible for presenting only one side of a dispute. The President is responsible for serving the entire nation. Only the Administration has access to all the information available to various agencies of the U.S. government—and withholding or downplaying some of that information for its own purposes is a betrayal of that responsibility.
P. J. O'Rourke deconstructs the speeches of the various Democratic presidential candidates.#
Voters are not really expected to pay attention to the grandiloquence. And candidates are not really expected to produce it. That is, candidates--major candidates, anyways--don't write their own speeches. Custom dictates that others take no credit for doing so. And the candidates cannot be said to "give speeches," as that phrase was understood from the dawn of language until Roosevelt and Churchill. The public speaking skills of the presidential candidates (Al Sharpton always excepted) are such that orations are more discarded than given, delivered in the paper-boy-and-porch-roof manner, a kind of campaign litter. Still, it's important to check what the candidates are saying, as opposed to what commentators say the candidates are saying--and, indeed, as opposed to what the candidates say they are saying when they are called to account for what they say. Thus the printed transcripts of thirty-six speeches by ten candidates have been read. Analysis of the contents may provide a lesson in contemporary democracy, or ("What we need most immediately is a sense of immediacy"--Joe Lieberman) it may not. [pg. 95]
And later:
Reading the candidates' speeches, one's mind wanders. And one's mind is not alone in its meandering. The whole nation seems to have drifted away from the candidates. "I want my country back," says Howard Dean. "I'm running for President to turn America around," says John Kerry. [pg. 96]